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Robert F. Nagel* 
Despite the variety and complexity of constitutional doctrines, 
a fundamental similarity runs through many of the Supreme 
Court's "analytic devices." At least some of the words keep chang-
ing, but the tune continues to sound suspiciously familiar. A "time, 
place and manner" restriction on speech must serve a significant 
governmental interest. The government may restrict commercial 
speech if its interest is substantial and its regulation directly ad-
vances that interest. Programs that aid religions must have a secu-
lar legislative purpose. To justify discrimination against a "suspect 
classification" the government must show that its purpose is sub-
stantial and the distinction is necessary for accomplishing that pur-
pose. Gender classifications must serve important objectives and be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Abortions 
may be regulated in the second trimester in ways that are reason-
ably related to protecting maternal health. Whether administrative 
procedures comply with due process standards depends in part 
upon the weight of the government's interest. State regulations that 
restrict interstate commerce must serve a legitimate local purpose 
and there must not be alternate means for promoting that purpose. 
In short, across a surprisingly wide array of subject areas' the Court 
strikes the same chord again and again: in varying degrees the gov-
ernment must justify its rules by articulating a sufficiently impor-
tant purpose and demonstrating that the rule will achieve that 
purpose. 
For the most part, the persistent recurrence of this theme 
seems to cause the Justices no embarrassment. Perhaps the appro-
priateness-indeed, the necessity-of demanding this general sort 
of justification is to them natural and self-evident. Nevertheless, to 
anyone not inured to the Court's methods, it must be perplexing 
that constitutional provisions apparently so different substantively 
should all turn out to have such similar meanings operationally. In-
• Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
I. The full text of the formulae from which these examples are extracted can be found 
in Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 166-68 nn. 3-18 (1985). For 
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deed, the coincidence is sufficiently striking that the uninitiated 
might wonder how much the Court's "interpretations" could possi-
bly have to do with the document itself. 
Scholars have sometimes attempted in sophisticated (and in-
ventive) ways to explain why the means-ends inquiry is relevant to 
the substance of particular provisions.2 Whether or not convincing 
on their own terms, these explanations do not directly address the 
questions raised by the coincidence that so many of these particular 
provisions all turn out to have the same essential meaning. One 
commentator has bravely faced up to this issue. Professor Cass 
Sunstein attempts to convert the mystery into an intellectual asset; 
the very fact of coincidence, he suggests, implies the possibility of 
"a unitary theory of the Constitution. "3 But why should a constitu-
tion, presumably designed for many purposes, be amenable to a sin-
gle theory? Professor Sunstein's answer is that the framers were 
broadly influenced by a concern that powers be exercised only on 
the basis of a sense of civic virtue, that is, only on the basis of the 
common good. Starting from this historical claim, he does not find 
it surprising that so many provisions are concerned with a demon-
strable relationship between laws and identifiable public purposes. 
Sunstein's approach is consoling not only jurisprudentially but 
also psychologically. It enables us to view the myriad judicial for-
mulae as neutral intellectual tools, subject to conscious control and 
calibration. To the extent that the typical demand for justification 
is shown to be inapposite to the substance of a specific provision, 
doctrine can be modified accordingly.4 The resulting preoccupation 
with adjusting doctrine is, then, premised on a bracing conception 
of the Constitution; rather than a collection of compromises or sup-
pressed disagreements or abstract ideals, its provisions are thought 
of as a series of objectives, to which the judiciary's formulae should 
be reasonably related. Concentration on the design of means-ends 
formulations thus permits the satisfaction that comes from a self-
contained intellectual system, for the universe of governmental ac-
tion, including judicial review itself, is to be assessed by a single, 
overriding criterion. 
2. E.g., Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Demo-
cratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049 (1979); Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional 
Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. I (1980); Leedes, The Rationality Requirement of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 42 OHIO St. L.J. 639 (1981); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualiza-
tion and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979); Perry, Modern Equal Protection and 
Due Process, 63 VA. L. REV. 383 (1977). 
3. Sunstein, supra note I, at 1732. 
4. Commentators have suggested, for example, that the demand be dropped when the 
decision under review is "expressive," see Bice, supra note 2, at 9, or "aesthetic," see Leedes, 
supra note 2, at 665. 
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This orderly vision, for all its obvious appeal, is hard to accept 
as a realistic description of the Constitution. Although the framers' 
political theory surely did involve fear of public power used for pri-
vate ends, the extent to which the demand for means-ends justifica-
tions runs through the Court's doctrines cannot adequately be 
explained on this ground. One reason is the variety that at least 
apparently characterizes much of the Constitution. It is implausible 
that provisions as disparate as that authorizing Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce (adopted as a central part of the original docu-
ment in order to strengthen the national government) and that 
prohibiting Congress from abridging freedom of speech (adopted as 
an amendment because of fears about the strength of the national 
government) can be anchored in a single generic value that reap-
pears much later in the Civil War amendments. 
In explaining the similarity in so many of the Court's doc-
trines, any appeal to the framers' design is further undermined by 
the range of uses to which those doctrines are put. Nearly any as-
pect of public policy turns out to be subject to the Court's preferred 
method of analysis. Should 65-foot "double" trucks be permitted 
on state highways? Should physicians be required to inform pa-
tients about the "detrimental physical and psychological effects of 
abortions"? May a community decide to keep posters off telephone 
poles? May aliens be excluded from the civil service? Should it be 
considered rape for a woman to have intercourse with an underage 
male? Should the Air Force permit its personnel to wear 
yarmulkes? May a state prohibit the distribution of pornographic 
pictures of children? Should a state automatically provide hearings 
before removing a child from a foster home? May an agricultural 
fair confine religious solicitation to a fixed location within the fair 
grounds? The Court has answered all these questions,s and a multi-
5. The Court's conclusions were as follows: The 65-foot "doubles" were not more 
dangerous than shorter trucks. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 
671-74 (1981) (plurality opinion). The abortion disclosure requirement would achieve "the 
antithesis of informed consent" because it would increase patients' anxiety. Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169,2180 (1986). The rule 
against posters was sufficiently related to preventing a "visual assault" on citizens. City 
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984). The civil service 
exclusion was not related to the important purpose of "having an employee of undivided 
loyalty." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641-42 (1973). Punishing only men for statu-
tory rape deterred teenage pregnancy. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472-73 
( 1981 ). Military uniforms encouraged "the subordination of personal ... identities in favor 
of the overall group mission." Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986). The 
prohibitions against distributing child pornography were related to " 'the protection of chil-
dren from exploitation through sexual performances.'" New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
757 (1982), citing 1977 N.Y. Laws. ch. 910, § I. Automatic hearings would serve no purpose 
if "a foster parent ... does not care enough about the child to contest the removal." Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families. 431 U.S. 816. 850 (1977). Confining the location for solici-
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tude of others, in large part by assessing the extent to which the 
government is achieving an articulated public policy. 
The pervasive application of the Court's methodology suggests 
something quite different from adoption of an intellectual tool for-
mulated to achieve the framers' purposes. It suggests a compulsive 
retreat to familiar mental terrain, a habit of thought more control-
ling than controlled. It suggests, in short, that modem constitu-
tional law is largely the free-floating application of one version of 
reason to public issues. 6 What is that version, and what are its 
implications? 
I 
The recurrent inquiry required by so much of constitutional 
doctrine has a name and an identifiable place in modem intellectual 
history. Michael Oakeshott termed the general approach "rational-
ism." Rational conduct, according to Oakeshott, is "behaviour de-
liberately directed to the achievement of a formulated purpose and 
governed solely by that purpose."1 Oakeshott's account is subtle 
but can be usefully sketched here because his description will be 
quickly recognizable to anyone coversant with modem constitu-
tional law. 
Seeking always to convert moral sensibilities into abstract 
statements, the rationalist prefers knowledge that is "susceptible of 
formulation in rules, principles, directions, maxims-comprehen-
sively, in propositions."s Although the rationalist knows that 
knowledge of this kind can be imperfect and in need of correction, 
he never doubts the possibility or utility of precise formulation.9 To 
be sure, "he can imagine a problem which would remain impervious 
to the onslaught of his own reason. But what he cannot imagine is 
politics which do not consist in solving problems .... "to Accord-
ingly, the rationalist sees no alternative but to bring "the social, 
political, legal and institutional inheritance of his society before the 
tribunal of his intellect . . . . "'' 
Of course, the methods of rationalism are of some use. And 
there is no doubt that these methods are to some degree appropriate 
tat ions would serve the state's interest in the "orderly movement of the crowd .... " Heffron 
v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649-50 (1981 ). 
6. I first suggested this in Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1174 (1979), from 
which much of the rest of this article is adapted. 
7. M. 0AKESHOTI, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 83 (1962) (emphasis in original). 
8. !d. at 10. 
9. !d. at 5, 7. 
10. !d. at 5. 
II. !d. at 4. 
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in the enforcement of a Constitution that was itself heavily influ-
enced by precisely this frame of mind. Indeed, so ascendant is ra-
tionalism in modern society that a predictable reaction to 
Oakeshott's description is to ask what alternatives are imaginable 
for the judiciary or any other conscientious decisionmaker. At-
tempting to supplement rationalism seems the equivalent of seeking 
alternatives to intelligence itself. 
Despite its currency, rationalism is not a synonym for all meth-
ods of moral and intellectual inquiry. It is not the same as insight, 
creativity, wisdom, vision, instinct, or empathy. Although the Con-
stitution was framed within a rationalist tradition, its design-
chiefly, the requirements of electoral accountability and multiple 
governments-plainly leaves room for the interplay of power exer-
cised on the basis of other types of decisionmaking. The Antifeder-
alists' major contribution to the Constitution was to insist on 
assurances that the new national government would not be exces-
sively powerful or culturally remote; they demanded that the oppor-
tunity for active participation and identification with government be 
preserved.Iz In response, the Federalists emphasized the variety of 
opportunities for organization and influence that a large and politi-
cally layered nation would provide.l3 The government, they ac-
knowledged, "must be able to address itself immediately to the 
hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support, those 
passions, which have the strongest influence upon the human 
heart."I 4 Under the proposed system the variety of immediate per-
sonal interests would "form ... many rivulets of influence running 
through every part of the society .... "15 Those who created the 
Constitution understood that power should often be responsive to 
self-interest and felt preferences. 
Given the range of legitimate bases contemplated in the Consti-
tution for the exercise of power, why has the demand for rational-
ism become pervasive? The simplest explanation begins with the 
fact that courts so commonly state constitutional values with glori-
ous abstraction. If a value is sufficiently abstract it will necessarily 
seem to have broad relevance to human affairs, important or petty. 
In large measure, constitutional interpretation has come to be the 
identification of a trace of some grand value in a particular provi-
sion and then the explosion of the meaning of that provision so that 
it stands for the grand value itself. 
The Court has said, for example, that "if the right of privacy 
12. C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS xl, li, liii, 388 (1966). 
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 {J. Madison), No. 51 (J. Madison). 
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 103 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 107 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child."I6 The equal protection clause invalidates laws that 
perpetuate "stereotyped view[s]" of men and women.11 The free 
speech clause is aimed at insuring that public debate is "uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open,"Is and ultimately it protects "the 
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political 
system rests."I9 
In its drive to find ever more expansive values in the Constitu-
tion, the Court has not been off on a frolic of its own. It is deeply 
enmeshed in a general intellectual fashion. Scholars have described 
the purposes of free speech as including "individual self-realiza-
tion"2o and "moral growth."2I The lowly impairment of contract 
clause has been said to be a limitation on rent-seeking factions and 
is thus "an essential part of our basic constitutional scheme of lim-
ited government."22 One scholar described the purposes of proce-
dural due process as maintaining "personal dignity and autonomy" 
and minimizing "subservience and helplessness. "23 Perhaps setting 
a record even in this highly competitive area, he described the pur-
pose of the right of association as "facilitating the emergence of re-
lationships that meet the human need for closeness, trust, and love 
... without which there can be no hope of solving the persistent 
problem of autonomy and community."24 
Constitutional values are stated at exalted levels of abstraction 
partly because modern sophistication, having liberated judges from 
the confines of text and history, has liberated constitutional values 
from the specificity that these can provide. The exalted nature of 
the values is also a corollary to assumptions about constitutionalism 
itself: the Constitution necessarily must address the most serious 
public concerns and must achieve a result that can be seen as virtu-
ous in order to be worthy of its fundamental status. Any imperfec-
tions or limitations in the document must be remedied by 
interpretation. The idea that the fundamental law must be 
16. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
17. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982). 
18. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
19. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
20. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591. 593 (1982). 
21. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 314-15 (1981). 
22. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 
717. 751 (1984). 
23. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIO:'>IAL LAW 560 (1978). 
24. !d .. at 988. 
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omnipresently virtuous is itself one aspect of the method of thinking 
that has become so confounded with the Constitution. The essence 
of rationalism, said Oakeshott, is "the imposition of a uniform con-
dition of perfection upon human conduct."25 To the kind of mind 
that believes autonomy and community constitute a "problem" that 
can be "solved," anything is possible; to such a mind even the great 
dilemmas (although annoyingly persistent) can be expected to yield 
eventually to proper analysis. "The odd generation of rationalism 
in politics is by sovereign power out of romanticism."26 
The coexistence within the constitutional design of rationalism 
with other forms of decisionmaking is precarious. The Court's re-
sort to the methods of rationalism not only has been but can be 
expected to be reflexive and arrogantly expansive. It is important, 
therefore, to consider how other aspects of the constitutional system 
are jeopardized by excessive reliance on this single strain in the 
framers' thought. 
II 
Although rationalism is no doubt compatible with aspects of 
the framers' thought and with traditional judicial methods, an un-
confined demand for rationalism in government is neither desirable 
nor realistic in a democracy. Treating social choices as a series of 
intellectual problems is reassuring to many in the educated classes, 
but it also tends to denigrate important values and to stunt moral 
and political discourse. At a time when it is increasingly fashiona-
ble to rationalize the scope of the Court's power on the basis of the 
capacity of judges to contribute to public dialogue,27 it is grimly 
ironic that the predominant judicial approach is a prescription for 
avoidance, misunderstanding, and obduracy. 
Articulation. Because rationalism emphasizes the conscious 
evaluation of whether a policy will achieve its objective, policies for 
which such analysis is inappropriate are unappreciated. If a gov-
ernmental decision is based on a value that cannot usefully be ar-
ticulated independently from the decision itself, the exercise of 
matching means to ends is disappointingly unnecessary. When a 
policy implements personal taste, for example, the objective is indis-
tinguishable from the policy. In such cases litigants, knowing (and 
25. M. 0AKESHOTI, supra note 7, at 6. 
26. /d. at 7. 
27. E.g., P. BOBBITT, CO!'STITt..:TIONAL FATE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, 182-
89 (I 982). Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables. 93 YALE L.J. 455 
(1984); Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative. 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); Perry. The 
Authority of Text. Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation ... 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 551, 577 (1985). 
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perhaps sharing) the intellectual predilections of the Court, desper-
ately generate separate, preferably "hard" objectives. The resulting 
assessment of the values at stake is often wildly inaccurate. For 
example, in requiring visual barriers around drive-in movie theaters 
that show films displaying nudity, a community is plainly expres-
sing a taste as to the kinds of images that will dominate its night 
sky.2s This preference, like a preference for quiet parks or for the 
grandeur of tall buildings, is part of a locality's self-definition. It is 
a statement best understood on its own terms, not as a proxy for 
some ulterior purpose. Nevertheless, the Court's evaluation of the 
barrier requirement solemnly emphasized the low probability that 
nearby drivers, distracted by some sudden vision on the horizon, 
might run off the road. In its relentless search for external justifica-
tions, the Court was too grave to notice the comic aspects of its own 
discussion. The foolishness of the community's asserted justifica-
tion, however, did not demonstrate that the ordinance was wrong, 
but only that its defenders had been driven to silliness by the 
Court's inapposite demands for derivative justifications. 
This problem is not limited, as is sometimes thought, to aes-
thetics. In the critical evaluation of any value choice there is virtue 
in clarity and directness. Public choices must be confronted as as-
sertions of identity and aspiration, as direct embodiments of value. 
Finding a connection between an independently-stated objective 
and a "rational" policy yields a satisfying sense of reasonableness, 
but the policy is not intrinsically better than one that is justified on 
its own terms. The reason behind the independent objective, after 
all, is also a matter of preference. At any rate, to the extent that 
constitutional rationalism forces communities to explain their deci-
sions in terms of relatively remote relationships between policies 
and objectives, absurd purposes are postulated and important values 
are unfairly trivialized. 
Simplification. Rationalism searches for conclusive answers to 
questions and "consequently the question must be formulated in 
such a way that it admits of such an answer. "29 If the values behind 
a rule are too subtle, intuitive, or varied for easy articulation and 
measurement, the rationalist will tend to ignore or simplify them. 
He will characterize the objective in terms that enable him to calcu-
late whether it has been (or is likely to be) attained. This process is 
endemic in constitutional adjudication. Like a cracked mirror, the 
Court reflects back to the public a weirdly distorted view of its laws 
and policies. For instance, when the Court upheld a statutory rape 
28. The case was Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
29. M. 0AKESHOTI, supra note 7, at 84. 
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statute under which only men could be criminally liable,3o the justi-
fication accepted by the Justices was that, since only women can 
become pregnant, the discrimination against males was related to 
the purpose of preventing teenage pregnancy. The opinion at least 
appeared, then, to rest on sober empiricism. But what of the possi-
ble bases for the discrimination that are not related so neatly to 
physiology? After all, sexual activity has long been believed to have 
different psychological implications for girls than for boys. It is one 
thing to deplore sexist double-standards, and quite another to sup-
pose that all such differences are negligible merely because they can-
not be proven as easily as the fact that only women can become 
pregnant. Yet the Court passed quickly over such matters with a 
brief allusion in the text3I and a defensive footnote about chastity,32 
returning with relief to the question of where the risk of pregnancy 
falls. That the constitutionality of this statute could have been ar-
gued and decided on the basis of birth control is dismaying. Crimi-
nal penalties are, after all, a draconian method of enforcing the 
objective of planned parenthood. A society that leaps to this de-
fense of its laws and customs is pitiable. Even more dismaying is 
the fact that the serious grounds for the statutory distinction were 
avoided because of the understanding, shared by all parties, that 
before the Court those grounds would inevitably seem frivolous. 
Complicated, vague, or sentimental objectives are not necessar-
ily inferior reasons for public policy. Many of the most important 
interests are pursued indirectly and partially. Constitutional ration-
alism tends to deprecate or ignore such values. This may distort 
public discussion even outside the courtroom and thereby make it 
more difficult for people to understand fully their own purposes. 
For instance, even among groups that should know better, there is a 
persistent effort to justify suppressing pornography by linking it 
with the tangible evil of sexual crime.33 This effort submerges less 
definite but no less important issues, such as the debasing effects of 
pornography on attitudes toward sex and on the quality of our met-
ropolitan environments. Thus the Court's limited version of public 
regulatory purposes can be self-fulfilling. 
Validation. The process of "rational" policy formation re-
quires that alternative means be compared and that policies be justi-
fied as promoting some preferred mix of the relevant values. 
Therefore, courts not only formulate purposes to permit potential 
30. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
31. /d. at 470. 
32. /d. at 472 n. 7. 
33. See generally Bryden. Between Two Constitutions: Feminism and Pornography, 2 
CONST. COMM. 147 (1985). 
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validation; they also often insist that evidence of the efficacy of a 
policy actually be furnished. The requirement of a "close fit" be-
tween ends and means is only one form of the demand for valida-
tion. The requirement that a rule be the "least restrictive 
alternative" for achieving a governmental objective permits courts 
to speculate about whether (and how effectively) a different policy 
might achieve the same social goal. 
These demands-that decisions be justified by proof of their 
consequences or by proof that the same consequences could not be 
achieved in some other way-are sometimes appropriate. But they 
are not as neutral and inevitable as they sound. They are biased 
against decisions, laws, and practices with beneficial effects that are 
difficult to isolate and identify. Important social decisions cannot 
be limited to those areas where information is readily available and 
susceptible to conclusive analysis. Indeed, the more important the 
policy, the more likely that it will have far-reaching impacts that 
are difficult to measure. In such areas, decisionmakers typically 
must act without full information. This phenomenon is equally ap-
plicable to judicial decisionmaking. In Craig v. Boren,34 the Court 
demanded hard statistics on the relative frequency of drunken driv-
ing by males and females in order to determine whether a gender-
based statute on the sale of beer was justified; its own decision, how-
ever, was based on speculation about the general degree of congru-
ence between gender and legitimate legislative purposes. Similarly, 
when courts seek to determine whether alternative means exist for 
the achievement of governmental objectives, the potentially unlim-
ited number of policy alternatives and consequences renders full in-
formation prohibitively expensive. When they engage in such 
analysis, therefore, courts do not demand actual proof that other 
policies can achieve the desired goal; instead, they rely on judicial 
notice and speculation.Js The difference between courts and other 
decisionmakers in this regard is that courts often are no longer in-
volved in the controversy when information about the effects of 
their policies does begin to become available; or, if still involved, 
courts have special reasons for being unreceptive to the new infor-
mation.36 At any rate, requiring a close empirical "fit" between 
34. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
35. For example. in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969), the Court opined 
that states can prevent welfare fraud by "investigations" and "cooperation among state wel-
fare departments.·· 
36. The courts may become uninvolved simply because the "case" has been terminated. 
Even when new cases are initiated, many characteristics of the judicial process discourage 
receptivity to the new information. The original decision may have been rationalized as a 
matter of principle. In addition, the need for decisional consistency discourages acknowl-
edgement of new information even when the original decision was overtly based on empirical 
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policy and objective can subvert highly important judicial policies, 
just as it subverts important legislative policies. On precisely those 
issues where participants in the political process might well con-
sider innovative or risky measures, constitutional rationalism is 
disabling. 
The demand for empirical validation is debilitating to the polit-
ical process in another way. It skews dialogue away from aspira-
tion. Implicitly it legitimizes a dull and limited view of public 
policy as being nothing more than a grappling with the present. In 
Craig, for instance, the Court conceived the legislative determina-
tion as being only that young females are more likely than males to 
be responsible drinkers. Like many public decisions, however, the 
statutory distinction was also an affirmation, no matter how be-
nighted, about a suitable or desirable future. The statute was part 
of a complex web of legal determinations cumulatively representing 
judgments about appropriate roles within the family and relations 
between the sexes. An aspect of the statute's function was to create 
a reality where young women saw themselves, consistently with the 
hopes of their political community, as careful and mature. Now, it 
may well be that this effort to shape the future was unwise or even 
deeply unfair.37 Probably the creation of a reality where men and 
women are equally responsible at all ages would be better. But it is 
certain that the reason for preferring the latter vision will not be 
found by examining the data on roadside sobriety tests. Neither 
those who oppose nor those who support gender differentiation are 
adequately served by a judicial decision that elides their desire to 
shape the future. To conceive the issues this way degrades the equal 
protection clause and retards public understanding of the subtlety 
and power of public decisionmaking. 
Intentionality. A controversial but tenacious idea in modern 
constitutional law is the proposition that the Court should credit 
only the "actual" legislative purpose, not purposes supplied with 
information. For example, school desegregation orders are still entered on the premise that 
separate schooling instills a feeling of inferiority in minority students that affects educational 
performance, as in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954), despite the 
discrediting of the original data upon which that premise was based. See material cited in P. 
BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 461 n.20 (1975). Moreover, a 
single judge or panel of judges provides only limited points of access for new information and 
a limited number of perspectives (and, therefore, less sensitivity to the importance of new 
information). For a general discussion of the tendencies of central, unitary decisionmakers to 
be rigid in their use of new information, see C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOC-
RACY 196-98, 230-31 (1965). 
37. The Court's only hint as to why this might be was a cryptic allusion to the "norma-
tive philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause .... " Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 204 (1976). 
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the benefit of hindsight.3s Although it sounds like tough realism, 
this idea is impractical. There are many sound reasons for embark-
ing on an activity before finally formulating an objective. Because 
the potential consequences of an important program are often un-
limited, decisionmakers lack the resources to gather and evaluate all 
the relevant information.39 Accordingly, it may be desirable to be-
gin a tentative program and to reformulate incrementally both the 
objectives and the means chosen for their achievement in light of 
actual experience. The reformulated objectives can differ dramati-
cally from the original, tentative objective.40 Thus, constitutional-
ism that requires a decisionmaker to identify consequences (and 
relate them to an articulated value) before acting can result in the 
abandonment of potentially useful activity. 
The utility of experimentation is sufficiently obvious that the 
recurrent judicial insistence on the original articulation of purpose 
is comprehensible only as an expression of the assumptions of ra-
tionalism. The fundamental objective of rationalism is not a rule 
that is (or turns out to be) wise or fair; the objective is the rational 
formulation of policy. If the value was not articulated before the 
policy was adopted, conscious analysis could not have been em-
ployed in formulating the policy. 
One view of morality holds that moral values cannot be known 
independently of the activities to which they refer, for "the objects 
of our desires are known to us in the activity of seeking them."4t 
Even if public values sometimes can be adequately stated prior to 
implementation, it is nevertheless clear that important values can 
also be discovered during the performance of an activity. Constitu-
tional rationalism disfavors such values and frustrates policies that 
are no less important for having been justified by experience. The 
Court's approach belittles political dialogue and participation, for 
those processes depend on trusting and honoring the reactions of 
the public to the experience of being governed. The dignity and 
importance of political involvement does not consist in the formula-
tion of neat intellectual solutions. It consists in trying, failing, and 
learning. 
Originality. In significant parts of constitutional law the identi-
38. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982); Kassel v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 680 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). For 
academic support for this approach, see L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 1085-86; Bennett, supra 
note 2, at 1057-60; Leedes, supra note 2, at 665. 
39. C. LINDBLOM, supra note 36, at 142, 137-39, 146-47. 
40. For a provocative argument on the need to disregard the known costs of an activity 
in order to discover unknowable potential benefits, see Gilder, Prometheus Bound, HARPER'S 
MAGAZINE, Sept. 1978, at 35. 
41. M. OAKESHOTI, supra note 7, at 105. 
1987] RATIONALISM 21 
fication of "archaic and stereotypic notions"42 is a prelude to invali-
dation. This is to say the courts often operate under the assumption 
that beliefs which originate in tradition (and thus have the advan-
tage, at least, of being time-tested) are impermissible bases for pub-
lic policy, unless they can be justified by some rational standard 
extrinsic to the tradition. The foundation for this hostility to cus-
tomary attitudes is that traditional policies are seen as being reflex-
ive rather than as being the products of conscious thought. "Like a 
foreigner or a man out of his social class, [the rationalist] is bewil-
dered by a tradition ... of which he knows only the surface .... 
And he conceives a contempt for what he does not understand 
.... "43 The "irrational" quality of reliance on traditional values is 
so intolerable to the constitutional rationalist that the absence of 
social change is itself sometimes considered to be evidence that the 
political system is malfunctioning.44 
Not surprisingly, the felt interests of those who hold affection 
for tradition are systematically ignored by constitutional rational-
ists. The Court once, in effect, declared it impermissible for a gov-
ernment to distribute resources so as to encourage traditional family 
life.4s Also notable have been the Court's assertions that neither a 
fetus' father nor a pregnant girl's parents have any interest in the 
abortion decision that is distinct from the interest of the state it-
self.46 Frequently, judicial disapproval of tradition is only implicit, 
as when the Court cannot bring itself-perhaps because of em-
harassment-to state forthrightly or seriously the old-fashioned ba-
sis for some statute. Rules that required pregnant school teachers 
to leave their jobs when they began to "show" had long antecedents 
in squeamish (but complicated) attitudes towards the physical as-
pects of pregnancy; in fact, at times it has been customary for wo-
men to remove themselves from society during a long period of 
"confinement. "47 Nevertheless, the Court's stonefaced analysis of a 
school's pregnancy policy centered on the "modern" justification to 
the effect that pregnancy might render a teacher incapable of per-
forming her duties.4s 
42. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). 
43. M. 0AKESHOIT, supra note 7, at 31. 
44. E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 1091-92. 
45. Impermissible, that is, if the preference for traditional families was linked to a desire 
to harm "hippie communes," which had been excluded from the food stamp program. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
46. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976). 
47. The highly ambiguous mingling of humiliation, self-indulgence, prudery and ideal-
ism that characterized attitudes towards pregnancy during much of the nineteenth century 
and well into the twentieth is thoughtfully discussed in R. WERTZ, D. WERTZ, LYING-IN: A 
HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA 79-81 (1977). 
48. Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Only in an entirely 
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As the example of pregnancy policies suggests, customary ways 
of thinking should not always prevail in the political process. Some 
traditions are indeed outmoded and repressive. But to envision the 
Constitution as requiring a continuing presumptive hostility to the 
past creates the danger that courts will prevent people from build-
ing a coherent knowledge and sense of morality. Even the fact that 
prudish attitudes about pregnancy have become outdated is some-
thing that needs to be brought out, tested, and legitimated through 
the kind of political debate that is avoided by adjudication. To the 
extent that adjudication does contribute to political dialogue, the 
need for change cannot be fully understood if the Court is itself too 
squeamish about our history to portray sensitively what it is that we 
are changing from. 
It should be equally obvious (although to the rationalist it is 
not) that traditional ways of thinking are entitled to respect as such. 
It is possible for a person to resist change for no reason other than 
appreciation of the present;49 for such a person, to attempt to per-
petuate habitual assumptions is not somehow illegitimate, but a 
normal effort to protect perceived self-interest. That representative 
government might reflect such preferences is not more objectionable 
than a majoritarian preference for change. 
Habitual denigration of traditional values carries the risk that 
certain groups will come to see the Constitution as an alien docu-
ment, used by segments of the educated classes to belittle and un-
dermine their ways of life. Political tolerance and participation 
presuppose self-respect and self-confidence. If accumulated exper-
iences and perceptions-a person's background and identity-are 
distrusted in public decisionmaking, an important source of polit-
ical vitality is threatened. 
III 
The wide range of issues to which the standards of constitu-
tional rationalism are now routinely applied has troubling implica-
tions, not only for political discourse, but also for the legislative 
process. The danger is that, because of the prestige of constitutional 
law and its constant use, legislators will begin to think like judges. 
Because it is the failure of legislators to act "rationally" that 
triggers and controls active constitutional scrutiny, it is no wonder 
that the judiciary has had to be so busy tidying up government. 
Legislators do not always know or articulate moral objectives before 
dismissive footnote did the Court mention "the possible role of outmoded taboos .... " /d. at 
641, n.9. 
49. See M. OAKESHOTI, supra note 7, at 168-96. 
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enacting programs and frequently rationalize them to their constitu-
ents only afterwards. When legislators do announce values before 
adopting programs, the announced values are often either con-
cocted or, at least, subject to being altered to reflect subsequent ex-
perience with the policy. They attempt to accommodate complex 
and hopelessly conflicting values in the same policy. After an-
nouncing grand objectives, they quickly alter or renounce these 
goals in subsequent legislation. They respond to wildly irrational 
arguments and even to power unadorned by intellectual argumenta-
tion. No legislator hears from or knows of all the affected interests 
before a decision. Legislators rarely possess in advance full infor-
mation about the consequences of a decision, and they do not neces-
sarily pay any attention to the information they do have. Compared 
to the detached, careful evaluation of briefs and evidence in light of 
an explicit, consistent set of legal values that is the ideal of the judi-
cial process, the legislative process is a nightmare of irrational 
decisionmaking. 
Legislative "irrationality," however, provides real advantages 
to a democratic system.so If values need not be formally articulated 
and consistently pursued, legislators can serve many interests at 
once. They are free to respond to the intensity of constituents' be-
liefs, so that groups whose values are difficult to formalize or ex-
plain, but are nonetheless strongly held, can be accommodated. 
Even if no one objective is fully achieved, many groups can be par-
tially satisfied and can therefore be expected to retain some sense of 
loyalty to the governmental process. Because negotiation and trad-
ing "across substantive fields" are encouraged, the hard sacrifices 
that different allocations of resources require are implicitly recog-
nized.si In the bartering process, people with widely divergent in-
terests are compelled to deal with each other and to recognize the 
probable costs that their own preferences will inflict on others; thus 
new understandings and new values emerge as citizens experience 
firsthand the processes of self-government. Because compromise is 
necessary and abstract argument is of limited value, groups are en-
couraged to find the common ground in their positions, rather than 
to insist on apparently irreconcilable differences of principle. When 
legislators are free to act "irrationally," they can act even when full 
information about the consequences of their decisions is unavaila-
50. The discussion in this paragraph is based heavily on the work of Lindblom, espe-
cially chapters 13-15 of THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY. C. LINDBLOM, supra note 36, 
at 192-246. 
51. This point is elaborated with regard to environmental decisions in E. HAEFELE, 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 131 (1973). It is 
also developed in C. LINDBLOM, supra note 36, at 87-101, 151-61, 293-310. 
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ble. Because values need not be abstractly identified before action, 
and because legislators can attempt partial effectuation of those val-
ues that are identified, government can experiment with possible so-
lutions, retaining the capacity for quick reversal in the face of 
evidence of failure. Because information is received and evaluated 
by a large number of individuals (with differing sensitivities), a leg-
islative body can respond rapidly to a wide range of perceived im-
perfections in the initial policy. The risks of taking action in an 
imperfectly understood world can thereby be minimized. 
The legislative process need not be romanticized. It works im-
perfectly and looks worse. But to judge it solely by the standards of 
constitutional rationalism is to undermine much of the usefulness of 
legislatures in a democracy. 
IV 
Judges find so many parts of the Constitution to mean essen-
tially the same thing because, in interpreting the document, they 
mistake their own intellectual habits for its content. The pressures 
to do this are probably inexorable and are unlikely to diminish with 
changes in the political complexion of the federal bench. Rational-
ist judicial habits are part of a larger rationalist culture which in-
cludes legal education.s2 Not only is rationalism a powerful 
influence generally, but the political insulation of the judiciary-
often touted as the reason it can contribute usefully to public dis-
course-ensures excessive, uncritical reliance on one narrow ana-
lytic method: 
How appropriate rationalist politics are to the man who, not brought up or edu-
cated to their exercise, finds himself in a position to exert political initiative and 
authority, requires no emphasis. His need of it is so great that he will have no 
incentive to be skeptical about the possibility of a magic technique of politics which 
will remove the handicap of his lack of political education. The offer of such a 
technique will seem to him the offer of salvation itself .... s3 
Neither the Justices' education nor their position is likely to 
encourage doubts about the power of one version of intellect to cre-
ate a pervasively just society. 
52. Oakeshott wrote that rationalism, as a technique of knowledge, 
can be taught best to those whose minds are empty; and if it is to be taught to one 
who already believes something, the first step of the teacher must be to administer a 
purge, to make certain that all prejudices and preconceptions are removed, to lay 
his foundation upon the unshakable rock of absolute ignorance. M. OAKESHOTI, 
supra note 7, at 12. 
53. Id. at 23. 
